2012 Judges’ Bench Memorandum by unknown
Pace Environmental Law Review Online Companion
Volume 3
Issue 1 Twenty-Fourth Annual Pace University Law




2012 Judges’ Bench Memorandum
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review Online Companion by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact
cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation







NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MOOT COURT 
COMPETITION 
PACE LAW SCHOOL 
 
2012 Judges’ Bench Memorandum 
 
Regulatory And Factual Framework  
A. Parties 
The State of New Union (New Union) overlies five percent of 
the Imhoff Aquifer.  The rest of the aquifer underlies Lake Temp, 
which is solely contained within the adjoining State of Progress.  
New Union’s Department of Natural Resources (DNR) regulates 
and runs a use-permitting program for the aquifer waters.  New 
Union was the plaintiff in the district court and is the appellant 
on appeal. 
The United States administers a permitting program via the 
Secretary of the Army and the Army Corps of Engineers (COE) 
for the discharge of fill material to navigable waters under the 
CWA.  The COE issued a permit to the Department of Defense 
(DOD) to deposit a slurry of pulverized munitions into the dry 
lakebed of Lake Temp.  The United States was the respondent 
below and is the appellee on appeal. 
The State of Progress (Progress) shares a border with New 
Union.  It overlies ninety-five percent of the Imhoff Aquifer.  The 
entirety of Lake Temp and the majority of the watershed draining 
into that lake lie within Progress.  Progress was an intervenor in 
the district court and is an appellee on appeal. 
B. Applicable Rules of Law 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 
1
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28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) 
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA) § 101, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251 (2006) 
CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006) 
CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) 
CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) 
CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) 
CWA § 509, 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (2006) 
40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008) 
33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2008) 
Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 13, 1978) 
 
Summary of Facts 
 The undisputed facts established in the court below are as 
follows: 
Lake Temp is an intermittent lake located wholly within an 
arid U.S. military reserve run by the Department of Defense 
(DOD) within Progress but not far from New Union’s border.  
Lake size fluctuates based on rainy and dry seasons.  At its 
greatest extent, it is three by nine miles wide but is entirely dry 
in at least one of five years.  An eight hundred square mile 
watershed drains into the lake.  Lake Temp has no outlets.  Lake 
Temp is an historic stopover point for ducks during migration.  A 
large number of duck hunters, the majority from Progress but a 
portion from New Union, have used the lake for hunting 
purposes.  A Progress state highway runs along the southern end 
of the lake close to its high water mark and intersects with 
several roads leading into New Union.  In 1952, DOD posted 
signs along both sides of the highway stating that entry is illegal 
and warning of danger.  There is no fence surrounding Lake 
Temp.  There is clear evidence that canoes and rowboats have 
been dragged between the highway and the lake.  DOD is aware 
that people continue to use the lake for hunting and bird 
watching but has done nothing further to restrict public entry. 
The Imhoff Aquifer lies one thousand feet below Lake Temp 
separated by unconsolidated alluvial fill.  New Union requires a 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/2
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permit from its DNR in order to withdraw aquifer water but no 
such permit has been issued to date.  The aquifer water cannot be 
used without treatment due to high sulfur levels and this 
information has been included in New Union groundwater 
inventories since DOD proposed the Lake Temp project.  Dale 
Bompers, a citizen of New Union, owns a ranch above the aquifer 
but does not use or plan to use its waters. 
This controversy arose when DOD proposed to construct a 
facility on the shore of Lake Temp to receive and prepare 
munitions for discharge into the lake.  DOD will mix liquid, semi-
solid, and granular contents of munitions, many of which are 
listed in section 311 of the CWA as hazardous, with chemicals to 
ensure they are not explosive and pulverize any remaining solids 
(primarily metals).  It will combine this waste with water to form 
a slurry.  Over a few years, DOD will spray the slurry into the 
dry portions of the lake from a pipe, which it will move 
continually to deposit the slurry over the entire dry lakebed.  Due 
to the arid location, the slurry will dry up relatively quickly.  This 
will increase Lake Temp’s maximum elevation by six feet and 
increase its surface area by two square miles.  Projections show 
that the enlarged lake will not protrude onto New Union 
territory.  COE will grade the edges of the lakebed so that runoff 
from the watershed will flow into it unimpeded.  Eventually, 
alluvial deposits will cover the lakebed, returning it to pre-
operation condition, but at a higher elevation. 
COE issued an individual permit for DOD’s proposed 
discharge to Lake Temp under section 404 of the CWA.  New 
Union filed a timely complaint against the United States under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 seeking review of 
COE’s issuance of the permit.  New Union claimed that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had the authority to 
issue the permit in question under section 402 and COE did not 
have authority to issue the permit under section 404 of the CWA.  
Progress intervened.  After discovery, the United States filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  New Union and Progress each 
cross-motioned for summary judgment. 
On June 2, 2011, the District Court for the District of New 
Union granted the United States’ motion for summary judgment 
and dismissed New Union’s action, holding that (1) New Union 
3
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lacked standing, (2) Lake Temp is navigable within the meaning 
of the CWA, (3) COE, rather than EPA, had authority to issue the 
permit in question under section 404 of the CWA, and (4) OMB 











Does New Union 
have standing? 
Yes No Yes No 
Is Lake Temp 
navigable? 
Yes Yes No Yes 
If so, does COE 
have authority 













Yes No No No 
 
The parties have been ordered to brief the following issues on 
appeal: 
 Whether New Union has standing in its sovereign capacity 
as owner and regulator of the groundwater in the state or 
in its parens patriae capacity as protector of its citizens 
who have an interest in the groundwater. 
o On appeal, New Union argues that it has standing 
in its sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of 
the groundwater within its boundaries and/or as 
parens patriae on behalf of its citizens. 
o The United States argues that New Union has no 
standing under either a sovereign interest or 
parens patriae theory. 
o Progress argues that New Union has standing in 
its sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of the 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/2
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groundwater within its boundaries and/or as parens 
patriae of its citizens.  (Although it would be to 
Progress’ advantage in this case for New Union to 
lose on the standing issue, that would establish a 
precedent against states’ interests generally.) 
 Whether COE has jurisdiction to issue a permit under 
section 404 of the CWA because Lake Temp is navigable 
within the meaning of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1311(a)(1), 
1344(a), and 1362(7)(a). 
o On appeal, New Union argues that Lake Temp is 
navigable and subject to the permitting 
requirements of the CWA. 
o The United States argues that Lake Temp is 
navigable and subject to the permitting 
requirements of the CWA. 
o Progress argues that Lake Temp is not navigable 
and not subject to the permitting requirements of 
the CWA. 
 Whether COE has jurisdiction to issue a permit under 
section 404 of the CWA or EPA has jurisdiction to issue a 
permit under section 402 of the CWA for the discharge of 
slurry to Lake Temp. 
o On appeal, New Union argues that EPA has 
jurisdiction under section 402 of the CWA to issue 
the Lake Temp permit. 
o The United States argues that COE has 
jurisdiction under section 404 of the CWA to issue a 
permit for the Lake Temp discharge. 
o Progress argues, in the alternative, that COE has 
jurisdiction under section 404 of the CWA to issue a 
permit for the Lake Temp discharge. 
 Whether the decision by OMB that COE had jurisdiction 
under section 404 of the CWA and that EPA did not have 
jurisdiction under section 402 of the CWA to issue a 
permit for the discharge of slurry to Lake Temp and EPA’s 
acquiescence to OMB’s decision violated the CWA. 
o On appeal, New Union argues that OMB had no 
authority to determine that COE, not EPA, had 
jurisdiction to issue a permit under the CWA and 
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EPA’s acquiescence to OMB’s decision violated the 
CWA. 
o The United States argues that OMB’s involvement 
in the permitting process was not improper. 
o Progress argues that OMB’s involvement in the 
permitting process was not improper. 
 
Standing: Did the lower court err in holding that New Union did 
not have standing in its sovereign capacity as regulator of a 
portion of the Imhoff Aquifer or as parens patriae on behalf of its 
citizens? 
New Union and Progress contend that New Union has 
standing due to its sovereign interest in the Imhoff Aquifer and 
as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens.  The United States 
contends that New Union has no standing because it cannot show 
an actual or imminent injury under the Lujan test and has no 
special position within the standing analysis as a quasi-sovereign.  
The United States also contends that New Union has no parens 
patriae standing because it has not shown that its citizens will be 
adversely affected by DOD’s proposed activity at Lake Temp. 
The first issue that the parties should address is whether 
New Union has standing as a sovereign under the Supreme 
Court’s most recent iteration of the “case and controversy” 
requirements of the U.S. Constitution.  Generally, in order to 
have Article III standing, a party must show a “concrete and 
particularized” injury that is “actual or imminent,” “fairly 
traceable” to the actions of the defendant, and “likely . . . [to be] 
redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  A state may bring an action alleging 
standing based on a sovereign proprietary interest. Connecticut v. 
Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2000).  The determination of this 
issue turns on whether the contamination of the Imhoff Aquifer is 
a concrete and imminent harm, as the causal relationship 
between the future aquifer contamination and the Lake Temp 
discharge is undisputed.  There are a number of arguments that 
the parties may make in relation to this question. 
New Union and Progress will argue that New Union has 
standing by way of its sovereign interest in the portion of the 
Imhoff Aquifer that lies within its boundaries.  New Union has 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/2
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presented circumstantial evidence that the slurry DOD proposes 
to spray into Lake Temp will eventually permeate the 
unconsolidated alluvial soil beneath the lake and contaminate the 
aquifer.  While it cannot predict the timing or severity of the 
effect on the Imhoff Aquifer, New Union will maintain that this is 
a concrete, imminent harm satisfying the first element of the 
Lujan test.  New Union will also point out that in order to predict 
the timing and severity of the effects in the aquifer it will need to 
collect data from a series of monitoring wells on the military 
reserve but that DOD will not allow access to its property for this 
non-military activity, thereby preventing New Union from 
proving the exact contours of the injury it will suffer.  In any case, 
the data collected from the wells will not be available until after 
the proposed activity occurs. 
In contrast, the United States will argue that New Union 
cannot show a concrete, imminent harm to its interest in the 
Imhoff Aquifer because it has not shown and cannot show the 
timing or severity of the contamination.  The United States will 
point out that “[a]llegations of possible future injury do not 
satisfy the requirements of [Article] III.  A threatened injury 
must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.” See 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990).  A fact weighing 
in favor of the United States on this point is that New Union has 
not applied for DOD permission to install the wells on the 
military reservation and gain access to this information. 
 
Massachusetts v. EPA 
An important sub-issue for parties to consider on this point is 
whether the Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA 
grants New Union a special place within the standing analysis 
due to its quasi-sovereign interest in its property and natural 
resources. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 
(2007).  This issue likely provides New Union and Progress with 
their strongest arguments in favor of standing. 
New Union will argue that, under Massachusetts v. EPA, it is 
subject to a lesser standing requirement due to a special interest 
(a “well-founded desire to protect its . . . territory”) as an affected 
state defending its quasi-sovereign interests. See Massachusetts, 
549 U.S. at 520.  It has already asserted a sovereign interest in 
7
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the Imhoff Aquifer by instituting a permitting system for 
withdrawals from the aquifer run by the DNR.  It will point to 
landmark cases such as Georgia v. Tennessee Copper for the 
proposition that “in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. . . . the State 
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its 
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.” Id. at 518-19 
(citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).  Just 
as Georgia and Massachusetts were granted standing in their 
land, New Union will argue that it must be granted standing to 
protect its sovereign interest in the Imhoff Aquifer.  New Union 
will point out that the size of its property endangered by the 
permitted activity is irrelevant to this special standing analysis; 
Georgia “[owned] very little of the territory alleged to be affected, 
and the damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at 
least, [was] small” yet it had standing. Id.  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has noted that Massachusetts’ large ownership 
interest in coastline affected by global warming “only served to 
reinforce” its standing to challenge EPA in federal court. Id. at 
519.  New Union may also highlight the fact that it runs a 
permitting program for all of the groundwater within its borders, 
which includes more than the Imhoff Aquifer, in order to show its 
substantial sovereign interest in protecting its groundwater from 
interstate pollution.  New Union may also bolster its standing 
argument by comparing the uncertainties in its future harm from 
the Lake Temp discharge to Massachusetts’ uncertainties in its 
estimates of future harm from global warming and sea level rise. 
See id. at 542, 554-56 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting scientific 
uncertainties in modeling effects of global warming with 
significant error rates).  Unlike Massachusetts, which owned the 
land where the harm occurred and could measure the effects of a 
presently occurring harm, New Union is unable to collect 
extensive, concrete data on the effects of DOD’s proposed project 
because it does not own or have access to the land where the 
harm will occur and the harm-causing activity has not yet begun. 
On the other hand, the United States will argue that 
Massachusetts v. EPA is distinguishable from the current case 
and therefore does not apply here.  In that case, Massachusetts 
presented extensive evidence from climate scientists and the NRC 
on the damaging affects of climate change on sea level rise and 
the state’s many miles of coastline. See id. at 521-23.  Unlike 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/2
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Massachusetts, in which extensive coastline had been and will 
continue to be affected by the alleged harm, New Union has only 
shown circumstantial evidence that contamination will 
eventually reach a very small portion of its groundwater. See id. 
at 522.  It has shown no adverse economic impact on the state or 
its residents.  Furthermore, it is not clear from the opinion in 
Massachusetts v. EPA that a state will or should always be 
accorded a special place within the standing analysis; four out of 
nine justices vigorously dissented to the standing analysis used 
by the majority. See id. at 535-60 (dissenting opinions).  The 
United States will differentiate this case from Tennessee Copper 
by pointing out that the resident plaintiffs in Tennessee Copper 
had traditional standing in their own rights unlike the residents 
of New Union, such as Dale Bompers. See id. at 538 (Roberts 
dissenting); see infra p. 7 and accompanying text on Dale 
Bompers’ standing.  The United States may also assert that New 
Union’s reliance upon Massachusetts’ relaxed state standing 
requirements is an “implicit concession that [it] cannot establish 




The other issue parties should address concerning standing is 
whether New Union has standing as parens patriae on behalf of 
its citizens.  This approach presents what are perhaps New 
Union’s weakest – and strategically least important – arguments 
for standing in this case. 
Aside from more traditional bases for standing such as a 
sovereign or proprietary interest, a state may also assert 
standing as parens patriae (“the parent of the country”) in order 
to protect the health, welfare, and public goods of its citizenry. 
See From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA: 
Parens Patriae Standing for State Global Warming Plaintiffs, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1059, 1068-69 (2008).  In order to assert parens patriae 
standing, the state must show a quasi-sovereign interest in (1) 
the “health and well-being – both physical and economic” of its 
citizens or (2) its rightful status in the “federal system.” Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico (Alfred L. Snapp), 458 U.S. 592, 
593 (1982).  It must show more than an injury to a single 
9
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identifiable group of people. Id.  The court must also consider 
whether the state has “alleged an injury to a sufficiently 
substantial segment of its population.” Id.  However, lower courts 
have held that a state may show parens patriae standing by 
alleging a “sufficient economic interest” in the case. See, e.g., 
Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 2d 
237, 246 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding parens patriae standing due to 
state’s economic interest in the regulation of its fisheries). 
Here, New Union and Progress will argue that New Union 
has standing as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens who will 
be injured if the aquifer is contaminated with the toxic slurry.  
New Union may point to Dale Bompers, a resident who owns a 
ranch overlying the Imhoff Aquifer.  Toxins from the Lake Temp 
discharge may negatively affect Bompers’ physical or economic 
well being as required in Alfred L. Snapp. See 458 U.S. at 593.  
While no one currently uses the aquifer waters due to high sulfur 
content, this does not preclude the possibility that New Union 
citizens could utilize the water in the future, especially given the 
increased drought conditions throughout the country and the 
possibility of treating the Imhoff’s sulfur-filled water. 
In response, the United States will argue that New Union 
cannot show parens patriae standing because it has not shown 
that the permitted activity will adversely affect its citizens.  For 
example, Dale Bompers owns a ranch above the aquifer but does 
not use or have plans to use the aquifer water.  Additionally, 
Bompers has no permit to withdraw aquifer water from the New 
Union DNR.  In fact, no such permits have been issued to date to 
anyone with respect to the Imhoff Aquifer, and New Union law 
prohibits withdrawal of groundwater without a state-issued 
permit.  The United States may also argue that the parens 
patriae analysis is not a separate standing analysis from Lujan 
but merely adds an additional criterion for New Union to prove – 
namely that it has a sovereign interest in addition to the 
traditional standing elements. See Massachusetts at 538 (citing 
Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S.  at 607).  The United States will also 
argue that a state may not assert parens patriae standing against 
the federal government on behalf of its citizens, as the federal 
government – not the state – represents the citizens in those 
matters. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/2
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The United States may attempt to strengthen its standing 
argument by pointing out that New Union failed to comment on 
DOD’s Lake Temp Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and 
therefore should be barred from challenging the resulting permit.  
While the failure to submit comments on an EIS is relevant to a 
claim under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), it is 
not relevant to standing under the CWA.  Additionally, laches or 
other equitable defenses based upon these facts are likely 
fruitless, as those doctrines are generally applied to preclude 
damages or injunctive relief and are “strongly disfavored in 
environmental cases.” Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 862 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 
Navigability – Did the lower court err in holding that Lake 
Temp was navigable and therefore subject to the permitting 
requirements of the Clean Water Act? 
The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants or fill 
material into “navigable waters” without a permit and defines 
navigable waters as “waters of the United States, including 
territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7).  Therefore, the 
navigability of a water body is a necessary element in order for 
EPA to issue section 402 permits and for COE to issue section 404 
permits.  In this case, Progress challenges the jurisdiction of both 
COE and EPA to issue permits for discharges to Lake Temp by 
claiming that the lake is not navigable.  New Union and the 
United States respond that the lake is navigable and therefore 
DOD requires a permit for its proposed discharge under the 
CWA. 
Courts have considered bodies of water traditionally 
“navigable . . . when they are used, or are susceptible of being 
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over 
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary 
modes of trade and travel on water.” See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 
557, 563 (1870).  However, recent agency regulations and cases 
challenging the constitutional reach of the CWA have – perhaps – 
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altered the meaning of the phrase “navigable waters” in the 
context of the CWA. See generally Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 
(2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2009).  This 
possible disconnect between the traditional notion and more 
recent understanding of navigability presents several arguments 
for parties to present in this portion of the appeal. 
Progress will contend that Lake Temp is not subject to the 
permitting requirements of the CWA because it is an intermittent 
body of water. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 733-34 (the CWA 
“exclude[s] channels containing merely intermittent or ephemeral 
flow.”)  In Rapanos, the plurality opinion required that a body of 
water be “relatively permanent” in order for CWA jurisdiction to 
attach. Id. at 732.  For example, a stream with a “permanent 
flow” clearly falls under CWA authority while streams that come 
and go “at intervals” do not. Id. at 732 n.5.  The latter is 
analogous to Lake Temp, which has no permanent standing 
water but is dry at intervals of one out of five years.  Additionally, 
Progress will argue that Lake Temp falls outside of the CWA’s 
purview because it does not affect interstate commerce: it is 
intrastate and has no outlets by which to affect other interstate 
or navigable waters.  Progress may attempt to bolster this 
argument by pointing out that the lake is not open to the public 
but is contained within a restricted military reserve, which also 
prevents it from affecting interstate commerce.  (However this is 
easily undercut by evidence of regular use by the public and a 
lack of enforcement by DOD.)  Drawing these arguments 
together, Progress could argue that, as a lake that is only present 
in four out of five years and flows to no navigable waters, Lake 
Temp should not be accorded protection under the CWA as a 
“relatively permanent” body of water; while intermittent 
tributaries of navigable water bodies are accorded such protection 
because they may convey pollutants to navigable waters when 
wet, Lake Temp conveys no pollutants to navigable waters at any 
time. 
In contrast, New Union and the United States have several 
strong arguments to support Lake Temp’s navigability.  Despite 
being “intermittent,” Lake Temp is traditionally navigable 
because it is capable of supporting interstate commerce in its 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/2
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ordinary condition, such as duck hunting and bird watching from 
boats. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563; see also United States 
v. Utah, 403 U.S. 9, 11-13 (1971).  It is also part of an interstate 
network within the eight hundred square mile watershed that 
crosses the border between Progress and New Union.  New Union 
may liken the Lake Temp case to that of United States v. Utah, 
where the Supreme Court found that an entirely intrastate lake 
was traditionally navigable because it was susceptible to use in 
interstate commerce such as running a ferry from the shore to an 
island and supporting excursion boats, which are comparable 
activities to the ones undertaken on Lake Temp. Utah, 403 U.S. 
at 11-13.  However, Progress can distinguish Lake Temp from 
Utah based on the physical characteristics of the lakes in each 
case – the lake in the former case was the Great Salt Lake, which 
is a significant geographic feature as compared to Lake Temp.  It 
can also distinguish the cases based on legal posture – United 
States v. Utah considered traditional navigability to determine 
whether the United States or Utah owned the land beneath the 
Great Salt Lake, whereas here the Court must decide the 
navigable status of Lake Temp to determine whether the United 
States has authority to regulate discharges to it. 
To further buoy the argument for Lake Temp’s navigability, 
New Union and the United States may assert that the Supreme 
Court has not detracted from CWA jurisdiction over traditionally 
navigable waters in recent cases but has merely clarified that the 
CWA applies to traditionally navigable waters plus certain other 
waters or wetlands. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730 (“the [CWA’s] 
term ‘navigable waters’ includes something more than traditional 
navigable waters.” (Emphasis added)).  Therefore, as a 
traditionally navigable lake, Lake Temp’s status as “navigable” 
within the meaning of the CWA would not be questioned by the 
Rapanos plurality although the lake occasionally dries up.  New 
Union and the United States will also reason that Lake Temp 
affects interstate commerce as evidenced by the aforementioned 
interstate hunters and bird watchers. 
 
SWANCC 
A sub-issue that parties may address relating to the subject 
of navigability is whether SWANCC affects CWA jurisdiction over 
13
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Lake Temp. See generally SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).  Here, 
Progress will challenge the lower court’s holding that Lake Temp 
is navigable and subject to the CWA by comparing the Lake Temp 
case to SWANCC, in which the Supreme Court ruled that adding 
fill material to intrastate seasonal ponds did not require a permit 
under the CWA because the ponds were not navigable. See id. at 
166.  However, New Union and the United States can easily 
distinguish Lake Temp, a significant three-by-nine mile wide 
lake, from the small ponds that had developed out of ditches at an 
abandoned gravel mine in SWANCC. See id. at 163.  Additionally, 
New Union and the United States will argue that SWANCC is 
inapplicable to the case at hand, as it merely rejected COE’s rule 
that included any waters (including intrastate ponds) that could 
be inhabited by migratory birds (Migratory Bird Rule). See id. at 
164.  Unlike SWANCC, New Union and the United States do not 
rely on the Migratory Bird Rule in order to establish the 
navigability of Lake Temp, which is traditionally navigable and 
supports interstate commerce in the form of duck hunters and 
bird watchers. 
 
Permitting Authority– Did the lower court err in holding that 
COE rather than EPA had authority to issue the Clean Water Act 
permit for the Lake Temp discharge because the discharge will 
raise the elevation of the lakebed? 
New Union contends that EPA, not COE, has authority to 
issue a permit for DOD’s discharge to Lake Temp.  The United 
States and Progress respond that COE has exclusive authority to 
issue a section 404 permit in this case. 
Under the CWA, EPA has authority to issue a section 402 
permit for the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters except 
where COE has authority to issue a permit under section 404 of 
the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).  COE has authority to issue a 
section 404 permit for the discharge of dredge and fill material to 
navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).  Both EPA and COE 
regulations define fill material as 
[M]aterial placed in waters of the United States where the 
material has the effect of . . . [r]eplacing any portion of a water of 
the United States with dry land; or . . . [c]hanging the bottom 
elevation of any portion of a water of the United States. . . . 
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Examples . . . include, but are not limited to: rock, sand, soil, 
clay, plastics, construction debris, wood chips, overburden from 
mining or other excavation activities, and materials used to 
create any structure or infrastructure in the waters of the United 
States. 
33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2008); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008).  This is an 
effects-based test to determine whether a pollutant qualifies as 
fill material and is therefore governed by COE under section 404 
rather than EPA under section 402. See Nathaniel Browand, The 
Shifting Boundary Between the Sections 402 and 404 Permitting 
Programs and the Definition of Fill Material, 31 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFFAIRS L. REV. 617, 624-29 (2004).  COE previously defined fill 
material using a purpose-based test, finding  that a pollutant 
qualified as fill material if the primary purpose and not merely 
the effect of the discharge was to raise the elevation of navigable 
waters. Id. at 625. 
The resolution of this issue revolves around Coeur Alaska, 
Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, which determined 
that COE – to the exclusion of EPA – had jurisdiction under the 
CWA to issue a permit for a mining company’s discharge of slurry 
to an intrastate lake. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska 
Conservation Council (Coeur Alaska), 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009).  In 
that case, the Supreme Court held that where COE has authority 
to issue a section 404 permit for a discharge of fill material under 
the CWA, EPA lacks authority to issue a more rigorous section 
402 permit. Id. at 2467.  Importantly, the slurry of crushed rock 
and mining wastes in Coeur Alaska met the definition of fill 
material and was therefore governed by section 404 because it 
had the effect of changing the bottom elevation of the lake, 
thereby giving COE jurisdiction under section 404. Id. at 2468. 
New Union’s main strategy will be to differentiate the case at 
hand from Coeur Alaska.  For example, in the earlier case, COE 
and EPA agreed that the discharge required a section 404 permit 
while these agencies disagree as to which permit should be issued 
for Lake Temp. Id. at 2464.  It will also highlight the fact that the 
lake in Coeur Alaska was being used as a treatment pond within 
a larger section 402 permitting scheme whereas Lake Temp is not 
part of a treatment system and not subject to a larger permitting 
scheme overseen by EPA. Id.  New Union will also point out that 
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the discharge in Coeur Alaska was the least environmentally 
disruptive alternative, while it is unknown if filling Lake Temp is 
the least environmentally disruptive alternative available to 
DOD. Id. at 2465.  Additionally, the Lake Temp slurry differs 
from the slurry discharged in Coeur Alaska, which consisted of 
tailings and crushed rock and not the heavy metals and 
previously explosive munitions materials.  New Union may make 
use of a portion of Coeur Alaska, in which the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the possibility that a section 404 permit could be 
used to discharge dangerous materials prohibited by EPA under 
section 402, such as toxic battery wastes or fecal matter. Coeur 
Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2468.  The Court stated that such “extreme 
instances” were not presented by Coeur Alaska but that a future 
plaintiff could challenge such an instance based on the agency’s 
interpretation of fill material. Id.  New Union therefore will 
assert that the Lake Temp discharge presents just such an 
extreme instance.  By including such extremely harmful 
pollutants (spent munitions, heavy metals, and previously 
explosive material), EPA and COE’s interpretation of the term 
“fill material” is unlawful under the CWA, the goal of which is to 
is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251; see Coeur 
Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2468.  This is not the type of material that 
the CWA envisioned as fill material but is the extreme type of 
pollutant that should be regulated under section 402. See id. at 
2483-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“a discharge of a pollutant . . . 
becomes lawful if it contains sufficient solid matter to raise the 
bottom of a water body . . . that is not how Congress intended the 
[CWA] to operate.”).  New Union will also differentiate this case 
from Coeur Alaska and fortify its argument that the Lake Temp 
discharge should not be defined as fill material based on the 
distinct effects on elevation presented in each case.  In Coeur 
Alaska, the fill material was projected to result in a significant, 
fifty-foot increase in the elevation of the lake, almost doubling its 
depth, while DOD’s proposed discharge in this case will raise 
Lake Temp’s elevation by a mere six feet. Coeur Alaska, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2464.  While EPA and COE currently use an effects-based 
test to determine whether a pollutant is fill material, it is not 
appropriate in this case.  Ultimately, New Union will argue, the 
Lake Temp discharge presents an entirely different case from 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/2
  
32 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol.  3 
 
Coeur Alaska – it consists of highly toxic munitions slurry rather 
than inert rock and will only result in a slight elevation of the 
lake rather than almost doubling the elevation. 
In contrast, the United States and Progress will present 
strong arguments that Coeur Alaska is controlling.  The current 
definition of fill material clearly covers the discharge to Lake 
Temp.  Here, just as in Coeur Alaska, the discharge of pollutants 
undeniably has the effect of raising the elevation of the lake.  
COE and EPA regulations make no distinction between 
discharges that raise the elevation of navigable waters by large or 
small increments, nor do they make distinctions based on the 
level of toxicity presented by the discharge. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2; 40 
C.F.R. § 232.2.  Therefore, the slurry DOD proposes to discharge 
to Lake Temp is fill material despite that fact that it consists of 
munitions and will only increase lake elevation by six feet.  
Because it is fill material, COE has exclusive authority to issue a 
section 404 permit under Coeur Alaska.  While the Supreme 
Court briefly acknowledged the possibility that “extreme 
instances” could present a problem for the agency definition of fill 
material and this permitting scheme, Lake Temp does not 
present such an instance. Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2468.  In 
Coeur Alaska, the plaintiffs discussed severe instances of water 
pollution, such as discharges of fecal matter and battery waste, 
but DOD’s proposed discharge is more analogous to the rock and 
mining wastes discharged in Coeur Alaska; DOD plans to treat 
the munitions to eliminate their ordinary chemical properties, 
leaving inert rock and metals in Lake Temp similar to the 
tailings left Coeur Alaska.  Just as in Coeur Alaska, the discharge 
will be covered by “native material,” which will eventually return 
the lakebed to its former state. See Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 
2465 (stating that the mining company planned to cover the 
tailing with four inches of native material).  Ultimately, DOD’s 
proposed discharge to Lake Temp is plainly fill material under 
the joint COE and EPA definition because it will have the effect 
of raising Lake Temp’s elevation by six feet.  Therefore, Coeur 
Alaska dictates that COE have exclusive permitting authority 
under section 404 of the CWA. 
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OMB Involvement: Did the lower court err in holding that 
OMB’s involvement in the interagency dispute between EPA and 
COE was proper? 
In this case, EPA and COE sent briefing papers regarding 
the Lake Temp permit dispute to OMB, which issued an oral 
decision and directive (not made a part of the record) that COE 
has jurisdiction to issue section 404 permit.  New Union contends 
that OMB’s involvement in the dispute rendered EPA’s decision 
not to issue a section 402 permit violative of the CWA.  It will 
make the case that EPA should have vetoed the section 404 
permit and issued a section 402 permit to DOD rather than 
acquiesce to OMB’s decision.  Progress and the United States will 
argue that Executive Order No. 12,088 specifically allows OMB to 
resolve such a dispute between agencies and that EPA was 
therefore justified in complying with OMB’s answer to the Lake 
Temp permitting question.  They will also argue that, in any case, 
EPA’s decision not to issue a permit is not reviewable. 
This issue revolves around the administration of the CWA 
and the resolution of conflicts between administrative agencies, 
namely EPA and COE.  The CWA states that the Administrator 
of EPA shall issue permits for the discharge of pollutants under 
section 402 and the Secretary of the Army shall issue permits for 
the discharge of fill material under section 404. 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1342(a), 1344(a).  Executive Order No. 12,088 states that the 
Administrator of [EPA] shall make every effort to resolve 
conflicts regarding such violation between Executive agencies . . . 
If the Administrator cannot resolve a conflict, the Administrator 
shall request the Director of [OMB] to resolve the conflict.  The 
Director . . . shall consider unresolved conflicts at the request of 
the Administrator.  The Director shall seek the Administrator’s 
technological judgment and determination with regard to the 
applicability of statutes and regulations.  These conflict 
resolution procedures are in addition to, not in lieu of, other 
procedures. 
Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 13, 1978). 
President Carter signed this executive agreement to ensure 
that federal facilities and activities complied with federal 
pollution control standards. See Margaret K. Minister, Federal 
Facilities and the Deterrence Failure of Environmental Laws: The 
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Case for Criminal Prosecution of Federal Employees, 18 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 153-54 (1994).  Another executive order that 
affects interagency disputes over jurisdiction is Executive Order 
No. 12,146, which requires the heads of administrative agencies 
to submit legal disputes – particularly over jurisdiction – to the 
Attorney General for a legal opinion prior to any proceeding in 
court. Exec. Order No. 12,146, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657 (July 18, 
1979); see Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Agencies?, 
17 ECOL. L.Q. 317, 328-30 (1990).  However, neither of these 
executive orders prevents the dispute from being resolved in a 
court of law. Steinberg, supra, at 328-30. 
In this case, OMB resolved a jurisdictional dispute between 
COE and EPA in COE’s favor under the CWA.  New Union will 
argue that this is the equivalent of OMB making EPA’s decision 
not to issue a section 402 permit for the proposed Lake Temp 
discharge and that OMB is not authorized to do so under the 
CWA.  EPA administers and implements most of the one hundred 
sections of the CWA and COE administers only section 404 
subject to EPA guidelines and veto power.  Nowhere is there 
evidence that Congress intended that OMB have authority within 
the Act.  Courts have cited EPA’s extensive power to implement 
the CWA as a reason for giving EPA deference in interpreting the 
Act. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 93, 112 (1991); Chem. 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985).  In making 
the decision that a section 404 permit is required for the Lake 
Temp discharge, OMB substituted its interpretation for EPA’s 
and prevented the administrator’s interpretation from being 
placed before the Court, which OMB has no statutory authority to 
do. 
New Union will point to cases and secondary sources 
suggesting that OMB interference with agency functions and 
decision-making is illegal.  For example, in EDF v. Thomas, the 
D.C. Circuit held that OMB’s contribution to a sixteen-month 
delay in EPA nondiscretionary rulemaking under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was unlawful. EDF v. 
Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 570-72 (D.C.C. 1986) (“OMB has no 
authority to use its regulatory review under [an executive order] 
to delay promulgation of EPA regulations . . . beyond the date of a 
statutory deadline.”); see also Public Citizens Health Research 
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Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507 (D.D.C. 1997) (recognizing a 
“vigorous” disagreement between the parties and within the legal 
community as to the constitutionality of OMB’s involvement in 
EPA decisions but refraining from deciding the issue.)  Many 
legal scholars challenge both the wisdom and legality of OMB 
oversight of agency decisions even where OMB does not cause a 
delay.  For example: 
This system . . . places the ultimate rulemaking decisions in the 
hands of OMB personnel who are neither competent in the 
substantive areas of regulation, nor accountable to Congress or 
the electorate in any meaningful sense. . . . [The] entire process 
operates in an atmosphere of secrecy and insulation from public 
debate that makes a mockery of the system of open participation 
embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: 
The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 
1064 (1986); see also Robert B. Percival, Checks Without 
Balances: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 156 (1991) 
(arguing that OMB oversight of EPA has usurped EPA decision-
making authority and resulted in delays, weaker environmental 
regulations, and reduced ability of public to monitor the 
regulatory process). 
Conversely, the United States and Progress will distinguish 
OMB’s action in the current case from its actions in cases such as 
EDF v. Thomas.  Here, OMB did not act to delay a non-
discretionary agency action beyond a statutory deadline set by 
Congress but merely resolved an intra-executive branch dispute 
as contemplated in Executive Order No. 12,088.  Furthermore, 
EDF v. Thomas was not a proscription of all OMB oversight of 
agency action or involvement in resolving disputes: “[OMB 
oversight] is not an inappropriate interference with the 
interaction of executive agencies; all such interaction may 
continue absent a ‘conflict with deadlines imposed by statute or 
by judicial order.’” Id. at 572. 
The United States and Progress may contend that the effect 
of OMB’s oversight is no different than the Attorney General’s 
opinion that EPA would need to seek under Executive Order No. 
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12,146.  However, New Union may respond that the Attorney 
General merely gives EPA a legal opinion as to its jurisdiction 
over the Lake Temp discharge, which differs from OMB’s actions 
in deciding that EPA should not issue a section 402 permit. 
 
Constitutional Arguments 
This case presents several possible constitutional arguments 
for and against OMB’s involvement in the Lake Temp permitting 
dispute.  Two constitutional principles central to these arguments 
are that all legislative power is vested in Congress and all 
executive power is vested in the President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, 
cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
Based on the separation of powers doctrine, New Union may 
point to the above constitutional principles in an argument 
against OMB’s involvement in EPA’s permitting decisions.  The 
separation of powers doctrine states that no branch of 
government may perform a function more properly performed by 
another branch without violating the Constitution. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 250 (James Madison) (cited in Michael W. 
Steinberg, supra p. 13, at 341); see, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 
U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that a grant of executive power to an 
agent of Congress was unconstitutional.)  The executive branch, 
including OMB, may not perform legislative duties or encroach 
upon legislative powers.  Here, Congress validly delegated power 
to EPA to administer the CWA and decide whether to issue a 
section 402 permit and whether to veto a section 404 permit. 33 
U.S.C.A. § 1251(d).  OMB – acting pursuant to the President’s 
executive power – then interfered with the legislative mandate to 
EPA when it determined that the Lake Temp discharge requires 
a section 404 permit.  This attempt by the executive branch to 
exercise power over an action that the legislative branch assigned 
to EPA violated the principle of separation of powers and is 
therefore unconstitutional. 
In response, the United States and Progress may rely on the 
unitary executive theory to justify executive branch oversight of 
EPA and other administrative agencies via OMB.  This theory is 
based on the idea that agencies within the executive branch, 
including EPA and COE, are subordinate to the President.  It is 
the President’s prerogative, under the constitutional mandate 
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that he or she “take care that the laws are faithfully executed,” to 
ensure interagency cooperation and coordination. See Meyers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (stating that the President 
has “general administrative control” and may “properly supervise 
and guide [administrative officers’] construction of the statutes 
under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform 
execution of the laws.”); see also Steinberg, supra p. 13, at 325-31 
(giving an overview of the unitary executive theory).  In other 
words, the “President, as the voice of each executive agency, has 
the ultimate authority to harmonize executive actions. . . . 
Disputes between two agencies therefore must be resolved 
internally.” See Minister, supra p. 13, at 154.  For example, the 
D.C. Circuit has upheld the validity of intra-executive branch 
communication, organization, and review during an agency 
rulemaking process due to the President’s “basic need . . . to 
monitor the consistency of executive agency regulations with 
Administration policy.” Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 
(D.C.C 1986).  Following this logic in the case at hand, OMB 
legitimately intervened in the interagency dispute between EPA 
and COE in order to “harmonize” actions within the executive 
branch.  OMB’s action was therefore a valid exercise of executive 
branch power over two executive agencies. 
 
Reviewability of EPA’s Action 
An underlying issue that parties may raise is whether EPA’s 
decision not to veto the section 404 permit for Lake Temp is 
reviewable.  The United States and Progress will contend that 
EPA’s consent to the issuance of a section 404 permit for Lake 
Temp is not reviewable by this Court because it was 
discretionary.  Section 404(c) of the CWA grants EPA veto power 
over COE’s decision to issue a section 404 permit for the 
discharge of dredge and fill material. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).  This 
section requires that the Administrator of EPA give notice and 
opportunity for a public hearing and then determine that the 
discharge at the specific disposal site would “have an 
unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies . . . 
wildlife, or recreational areas.” Id.  This veto authority is at 
EPA’s discretion. See Preserve Endangered Areas of Cobb’s 
History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 87 F.3d 1242, 1245 
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(11th Cir. 1996) (“the decision of the Administrator not to 
overrule the decision of the Army Corps is discretionary”); see also 
Alliance to Save Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 515 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 2008).  Under section 701 of the APA, 
discretionary agency action is not subject to judicial review. 5 
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006).  Therefore, EPA’s inaction in this case 
is not reviewable by this or any other court. See Preserve 
Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, 87 F.3d at 1245; see also 
Alliance to Save Mattaponi, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 4-5. 
In response, New Union’s best strategy may be to frame this 
issue of reviewability as irrelevant on appeal by distinguishing its 
argument on OMB interference from its opponents’ contentions 
regarding EPA’s failure to exercise its veto power: New Union is 
not challenging EPA’s decision not to exercise jurisdiction over 
Lake Temp or its failure to invoke its veto power under section 
404.  It is challenging the legality of OMB’s involvement in 
deciding whether EPA or COE had permitting jurisdiction over 
Lake Temp. 
Another strategy that New Union may employ regarding this 
sub-issue is to point to cases finding that EPA inaction under 
section 404(c) of the CWA is in fact reviewable in certain 
circumstances under APA section 701 or the CWA citizen suit 
provision.  For example, in Alliance for Mattaponi, the D.C. 
Circuit found that section 701 of the APA did not bar review of 
EPA’s failure to invoke its section 404 veto power over a COE 
permit because “the decision not to veto the permit had the same 
impact on the parties as an express denial of relief.” Alliance for 
Mattaponi, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 9.  In National Wildlife Federation 
v. Hanson, the court found that the plaintiff could bring a CWA 
citizen suit against EPA for failure to “exercise the duty of 
oversight imposed by section [404(c) of the CWA]” due to EPA’s 
nondiscretionary duty to regulate dredge and fill material under 
section 404. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 316 
(4th Cir. 1988); see also S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2008 WL 4280376 at *5-*9 (D.S.C. 2008).  
In sum, New Union will argue that, because EPA authority under 
section 404 of the CWA is not discretionary, EPA’s inaction in the 
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Arbitrary and Capricious 
In the event that this Court finds that EPA’s action in the 
Lake Temp permitting process reviewable, the United States and 
Progress will argue that such review is limited to whether EPA’s 
decision was arbitrary or capricious under section 706 of the APA. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 706.  These parties will recall their earlier 
arguments under Coeur Alaska to show that EPA’s decision not to 
veto the COE permit was neither arbitrary nor capricious because 
it was either required by or consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Coeur Alaska. See supra pp. 10-12.  New Union will 
answer that Coeur Alaska did not require EPA to acquiesce to 
OMB’s determination that COE had jurisdiction and EPA did not. 
See id.  Additionally, New Union can point to Chevron and claim 
that this Court cannot properly engage in an analysis of whether 
EPA’s decision as to Lake Temp permitting jurisdiction was 
arbitrary or capricious due to OMB’s involvement in EPA’s 
decision-making.  In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that, 
where Congress leaves the agency room to decide a particular 
issue before the court, the court must decide whether the agency 
acted based on a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  In this case, 
while Congress gave EPA the discretion to decide whether to veto 
a section 404 permit under the CWA, the Court cannot properly 
determine whether EPA then acted based upon a “permissible 
construction of the statute” because EPA’s action was based upon 
OMB’s decision, not on the factors enumerated under section 
404(c) of the CWA.  Furthermore, New Union will argue that 
EPA’s decision in this case was arbitrary and capricious because 
it was based on an impermissible construction of the CWA: EPA 
allowed OMB to decide whether it should issue a section 402 
permit or veto the section 404 permit but the CWA gives EPA sole 
statutory authority to do so. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344. 
 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the 
problem, merely an indicative list of issues to be discussed 
in written submission by teams.  One should appreciate 
reasoned and reasonable creativity and ideas beyond 









These questions are suggested as a starting point.  Please 
feel free to develop your own. 
 
Issue 1 (Standing) Questions 
 New Union & Progress 
o How can New Union meet Lujan’s concrete and 
imminent harm requirement when it cannot show 
the timing or severity of any future aquifer 
contamination? 
 How, if at all, is New Union’s standing 
affected by the fact that it failed to apply for 
permits to install monitoring wells on DOD 
property to determine the timing and 
severity of the alleged harm? 
o In seeking to establish standing by relying on the 
“relaxed” standing requirements of Massachusetts 
v. EPA, is New Union implicitly conceding that it 
cannot establish standing on traditional terms? 
o Can New Union validly assert parens patriae 
standing on behalf of its citizens when its citizens 
do not use the Imhoff Aquifer/will not be adversely 
affected by contamination? 
 Can New Union assert parens patriae 
standing against the federal government? 
 United States 
o Doesn’t New Union’s ownership of a portion of the 
Imhoff Aquifer and implementation of a permitting 
program for that aquifer give it standing as an 
affected quasi-sovereign? 
 How does Georgia v. Tennessee Copper affect 
state standing in this case? 
o Doesn’t the potential for future use of treated 
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o As a sovereign, does New Union have a public trust 
obligation to preserve its natural resources for 
present and future generations of its citizens? 
 If so, is the imminence of the harm to those 
resources relevant to its standing? 
 When is harm imminent here; when waste 
begins irretrievably to migrate to the 
aquifer; when it contaminates the aquifer, or 
when contamination reaches New Union? 
 
Issue 2 (Navigability) Questions 
 Progress 
o Isn’t Lake Temp traditionally navigable in that it 
supports interstate commerce in the form of duck 
hunting, boating, and bird watching? 
 Is this case distinguishable from Utah v. 
United States? 
o Justice Scalia stated in Rapanos that the Clean 
Water Act applies to something more than 
traditionally navigable waters.  Doesn’t this 
admission detract from any Rapanos-based 
arguments against Lake Temp’s navigability? 
o If the Clean Water Act accords protection to 
intermittent tributaries of navigable waters, why 
should Lake Temp – a lake draining and 800-
square-mile watershed – not be given the same 
protection? 
o Since New Union does not rely on the Migratory 
Bird Rule to show navigability, is SWANCC 
applicable to this case? 
 New Union & United States 
o Is Lake Temp navigable under Rapanos if it is dry 
one out of every five years? 
 Isn’t Lake Temp analogous to the streams 
that “come and go at intervals” that the 
Rapanos plurality determined are non-
navigable? 
o How can Lake Temp be navigable when it is 
entirely intrastate and has no outlets? 
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o Is Lake Temp distinguishable from the 
intermittent ponds in SWANCC? 
o In SWANCC the Court rejected the migratory bird 
rule as a test for navigability.  Didn’t that in effect 
rule out the argument that use of Lake Temp by 
interstate duck hunters makes it navigable? 
 
Issue 3 (Permitting Authority) Questions 
 New Union 
o Since the discharge of slurry to Lake Temp will 
raise the bottom elevation of the lake by 6 feet, 
doesn’t this discharge clearly fall under the 
definition of fill material? 
 Is there any legal authority suggesting that 
toxicity be taken into account when 
determining whether a discharge constitutes 
fill material? 
o Is Coeur Alaska distinguishable from the case at 
hand? 
 United States & Progress 
o In Coeur Alaska, the Supreme Court noted that 
there could be extreme instances in which the 
discharge of fill material may warrant a section 402 
permit, such as the discharge of toxic battery 
waste.  How does the toxic slurry DOD proposes to 
discharge to Lake Temp differ from such an 
extreme instance? 
o In Coeur Alaska, the parties agreed that filling the 
lake was the least environmentally disruptive way 
to dispose of the mining waste.  In this instance, it 
is not clear whether filling Lake Temp is DOD’s 
least environmentally disruptive alternative or that 
other alternatives have even been explored.  How, 
if at all, does this affect COE’s permitting authority 
under section 402? 
o In Coeur Alaska, EPA agreed with the COE that a 
404 permit was required.  Here EPA believes a 402 
rather than a 404 permit is required.  As the 
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agency administering the whole CWA, shouldn’t 
EPA’s opinion be given deference? 
 
Issue 4 (OMB Involvement) Questions 
 New Union 
o EDF v. Thomas dealt with OMB actions that 
delayed a non-discretionary agency action beyond a 
statutory deadline.  OMB created no such delay in 
relation to the Lake Temp permit.  Isn’t EPA’s 
authority to veto a section 404 permit 
discretionary?  See section 404(c).  In light of the 
dissimilarity between the two cases, how, if at all, 
is EDF v. Thomas relevant to the case at hand? 
o In Sierra Club v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit stated 
that the President has a “basic need . . . to monitor 
the consistency of executive agency regulations.”  
Isn’t that what the executive branch was doing via 
OMB in the Lake Temp dispute? 
o Is EPA’s decision not to veto the Lake Temp permit 
discretionary under section 404(c)?  If so, is it 
reviewable by this court? 
o If Coeur Alaska dictates that COE and not EPA has 
permitting authority for the Lake Temp discharge, 
is it possible for EPA’s decision not to veto the 
permit to be arbitrary and capricious? 
o Isn’t the President ultimately responsible for the 
execution of the laws enacted by Congress, as a 
function of Article II of the Constitution?  If so, why 
doesn’t the President have authority to direct the 
Administrator of EPA how to exercise discretionary 
authority, such as the authority to veto a 404 
permit? 
 United States & Progress 
o The Supreme Court has noted EPA’s extensive 
power to implement the Clean Water Act.  
Congress did not name OMB as an administrator of 
the Clean Water Act or decide whether to veto a 
404 permit.  Where does OMB get its authority to 
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dictate EPA’s decision to issue or refrain from 
issuing a permit for Lake Temp? 
o Doesn’t OMB’s involvement in EPA’s 
administration of the Clean Water Act violate the 
Separation of Power doctrine? 
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